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by changing the composition of the electorate. In a world of micro-targeted messaging, reporters have
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The “analytics-based tactical optimization” that David Karpf ties to the “culture of
testing” does indeed warrant his conclusion that “We are potentially moving from
swing states to swing individuals, employing savvy marketing professionals to attract
these persuadables and mobilize these supporters with little semblance of the slow,
messy deliberative practices enshrined in our democratic theories.” What is missing
from his précis of the nature and possible impact of new media technologies on politics, however, is a discussion of their effects on the content, tone, and potential electoral impact of the resulting messages. Absent as well is consideration of the role
money plays in securing access to these new tactics and culture and of the ways in
which imbalances in the funding of opposing campaigns can, as a result, affect election outcomes by giving one side a mobilizing and messaging edge over the other.
Such advantages matter because, as Kenski, Hardy, and Jamieson (2010) confirmed
in 2008, micro-targeting and imbalances in spending can shift vote preference.
Some of the results of the marriage of money and new media technology are
desirable, others less so. Individualized messaging can, for example, be used to
ensure that a voter receives an absentee ballot, knows where her polling place
is, or is reminded to vote. Because inter-personal appeals increase the likelihood
of voting (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Green and Gerber 2008), mobilizing
messages can affect the proportion of the total ballots cast by supportive groups
(in Obama’s case in 2008 and 2012, Hispanics and Blacks). Additionally, microtargeting makes it possible to mobilize one’s own supporters without activating
those who would cast their vote for the other side.
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Importantly, the campaign with more money will have a net electoral advantage as a result. Since turnout efforts have their greatest effect with low propensity voters in high-intensity elections and high propensity voters in low intensity
ones (Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009), we can also predict the groups most susceptible to mobilization efforts in this new venue. Just as targeted messages can
inform a voter about civic matters, they also can be used to misdirect and deceive.
One does not need to work hard to imagine how individualized messages carried
through the new technologies could be used to suppress the vote in ways unlikely
to be detected by election officials or vigilant reporters.
On the positive sign of the ledger, the capacity to tie tailored messaging to
specific target voters can increase the amount of issue and biographically-based
information that campaigns communicate. Such messages are, of course, selective. A pro-life union member in an Ohio or Michigan household will not be told
that Obama is pro-choice but rather that he championed and Romney opposed
the auto bailout. Nothing is new there. What is new is the ability to convey messages, both problematic and benign, without risking scrutiny and correction by
reporters or scholars. Lack of critical analysis is especially problematic when
such messages are pseudonymous, deceptive, un-rebutted attacks.
Because micro-targeted communication delivers “impressions” more efficiently and with less risk of backlash from unintended viewers than does mass
mediated content, it is reasonable to conclude that in coming elections third party
and campaign advertisers will shift more of their resources to these new technology channels. The reasons are straight forward. The mass media are an inefficient
way to reach the swing voters who decide how a state will cast its electoral votes
and viewer-use of remote controls and DVRs escalates the “cost per impression”
of mass media advertising even further (Prior 2007).
Just as candidate messaging increasingly will appear on line so too will that
by third party groups. Where these agents played only a minor role in 2008, in
the 2012 presidential race they were out in force. According to Wesleyan Media
Project data, in presidential primaries since 2000, “fewer than 15% of all ads were
aired by outside groups.” By contrast, “[i]n 2012, this share skyrocketed to nearly
60%” (Knight Foundation 2012). From December 1, 2011 through Election Day,
November 6, 2012, independent expenditure groups spent over $360 million1 on
presidential television advertising alone.2 By some estimates more than $1 billion

1 Excluding money spent by the Democratic National Committee (DNC) which sponsored its
ads with Obama for America and the Republican National Committee (RNC), spending totaled
$361,641,510.
2 Source: Kantar Media CMAG.
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was spent by third-party groups in 2012, “about triple the amount in 2010” (New
York Times 2012). This wash of dollars purchased unprecedented levels and proportions of independent expenditure advertising (Franz 2013). Since the upswing
in third party content is likely to continue, this shift in placement means that
the new technologies will probably carry increasing amounts of unaccountable,
deceptive attack.
That prospect is problematic because representative government requires that
voters be able to learn about the candidates who seek elective office. As Madison
noted in his 1798 report to the General Assembly of Virginia on the Sedition Act,
“The right of electing the members of the government constitutes more particularly the essence of a free and responsible government. The value and efficacy
of this right depends on the knowledge of the comparative merits and demerits
of the candidates for public trust, and on the equal freedom, consequently, of
examining and discussing these merits of the candidates respectively” (in Elliot
2006). Indeed, in their discussions of what would become the First Amendment,
the founders considered giving citizens the power to bind the votes of their representatives (see debate on August 15, 1789).
From the infamous midnight flyers or handbills that in the pre-broadcast
age contained the most scurrilous attacks (Jamieson 1984, 1992), to the “Horton
ads” of the broadcast era, third-party ads have increased the amount of deceptive
content parlayed to the public – a tendency likely to become more pronounced
now that advertisers’ messages are able to infiltrate iPods and iPads without
passing through channels of mass access. In many elections past the most inaccurate and most controversial ads have been sponsored by just the kind of pseudonymous third party groups whose numbers and budgets set records in 2012. So
for example, in 1988 the infamous “Willie Horton” ad by the National Security
Political Action Committee harbored more deceptive statements and invited a
greater number of false inferences than did the Bush campaign-sponsored “Furlough” one (see Jamieson 1992; Jamieson and Waldman 2003). In 2004, the Swift
Boat Veterans for Truth ads provoked a cascade of critiques from the fact checkers
unrivalled by the response to any other ads.
In 2012 both the pro-Romney and pro-Obama groups violated the expectations raised by Madison. In the primary period, the pro-Romney super PAC
“Restore Our Future” led the list in both dollars spent on ads containing at least
one deception and in the proportion of its ads containing at least one claim
judged problematic by the fact checkers. In the post-primary period, the proObama super PAC spent more on ads harboring at least one suspect allegation
than did the other third-party groups. The most controversial message posted by
Priorities USA implied that Romney bore responsibility for the death of a woman
whose husband had been laid off by a firm owned by Bain Capital. Not to be
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outdone, a pro-Romney group’s web ad alleged that the Affordable Care Act taxed
heart attacks, puppies, and babies. In 2012, Winneg et al. (in press) found that
more than a fifth of the dollars spent by the top third party groups purchased
ads containing at least one claim judged misleading by independent fact checkers. The likelihood that deceptive content will shift opinions increases when its
volume is higher than that of counter-advertising, a situation more likely when
content is micro targeted.
Third party advertising tends to carry a higher level of attack than candidate
messaging as well. When it is fair, accurate and relevant to governance, attack
is a part of healthy debate and indispensable to candidate evaluation (Jamieson
1992). Problems occur however when attack displaces the advocacy needed to give
voters a reason to vote for a candidate rather than simply against an opponent
and when there is too little advocacy to permit voters to learn about the promises
and plans that tie campaigning to governance. Although the evidence is mixed
(Goldstein and Freedman 2002), some research suggests that high levels of attack
may also demobilize target groups (Ansolabehere et al. 1994; Ansolabehere and
Iyengar 1995).
Historically, the weaker the association between an ad and the candidate,
the greater the likelihood that it will both attack and mislead. So, for example, in
1996 the level of attack in the presidential campaign ads was higher in the Democratic National Committee ads than in the Clinton-Gore ones. In 2004 the level
was higher in the progressive third-party ads than in the Kerry-Edwards ones; at
the same time, the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth ads contained a higher level of
attack than those sponsored by the Bush-Cheney campaign. In 2008 the thirdparty ads by groups supporting McCain featured a higher level of attack than did
those aired by his campaign itself. Consistent with that history, the Wesleyan
data suggest that in 2012 “[f]ully 85% of ads sponsored by non-party organizations were purely negative, and another 10% were contrasting, leaving only 5%
positive…. Party-sponsored ads, including coordinated expenditures, were also
predominantly negative; 51.1% purely negative with only 11.5% positive. Candidates, although they aired more positive ads than the groups or parties, were also
largely negative in their advertising” (Fowler and Ridout 2013).
When third parties mask their messengers behind nondescript names such
as Priorities USA or Americans for Prosperity, they make it impossible for audiences and more difficult for reporters to factor the source into assessment of the
message. Because sources with low ethos are by all accounts less persuasive than
those that have earned wide respect, the masking process forestalls inferences
that undercut the persuasiveness of messages (Andersen and Clevenger 1963;
Berlo, Lemert, and Mertz 1969). Misdirecting self-identifications also thwart the
ability of low information voters to draw generally reliable inferences about the
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self-interest of sponsoring groups (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Popkin
1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998).
Where ads carried in broadcast or cable channels can now be tracked by
groups such as Kantar-CMAG, no comparable process exists to enable reporters
and scholars to reliably intercept narrowcast information on the internet. As a
result we do not know the characteristics of the targeted messages that the Interactive Advertising Bureau reported accounted for between $130 million and $200
million in ad spending during the 2012 presidential election (Tsukayama 2013).
When reporters are able to locate ads, they can both hold them accountable for
deception and, in the case of pseudonymously sponsored ones, try to unmask
the funder. So, for example, during the prescription drug benefit debate, news
accounts revealed that “United Seniors Association” was backed by the pharmaceutical industry and, in 2012, Americans for Prosperity, funded in part at least by
the Koch brothers. Voters who are aware of the identity of the funder can then add
to their evaluation of the message such press-provided information as the fact
that one of the Koch companies merited a large civil penalty “for its role in more
than thirty oil spills in 2000” (Mayer 2013).
Where does all of this leave us? Contrary to The New Yorker cartoon in which
no one on the internet knows you are a dog, in the politics of 2016 – in which
randomized A/B testing enables advertisers, in Karpf’s words, “to optimize every
element” of an “online communication strategy”– messengers reaching out to
swing voters will not only know that you are not a dog but also that you are a size
10, 36 year old white married pro-choice female mother of three children under
18 who is a vegetarian, reads the New York Times, shops at Costco, reliably votes,
drives a Prius, watches Good Wife and CBS News and has clicked on an internet
ad of their campaign’s at least once. If that voter receives internet messages proclaiming that the Republican in the race opposes stem cell research, and that
information is inaccurate, how will she know? When such a scenario played out
in 2008 in micro-targeted radio, the fact-checkers spotted and debunked the false
attack on John McCain. Had the same misinformation reached our hypothetical
swing voter in 2008 only over the web, those reporters may well not have known
that it existed.

Implications for Future Research
The lessons of elections past teach that campaign messages made memorable by
third-party money can increase the level of un-rebutted deceptive attack while
at the same time diminishing both the audience’s capacity to factor a message’s
source into its assessment of message and the press’s capacity to unmask decep-
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tion and reveal sponsors’ self-interests. In the process these often pseudonymous
messages can, to take a few liberties with Madison’s words, alter “the essence of a
free and responsible government” by circumscribing the citizenry’s “knowledge
of the comparative merits and demerits of the candidates for public trust” and its
ability to examine and discuss the merits of the candidates.
In a world of micro-targeted messaging, it is difficult for reporters and scholars to know who is saying what to whom, where and with what effect. In the
absence of such information, journalists’ ability to hold sources accountable is
even more circumscribed than when pseudonymous groups broadcast their messages in places open to public view. And without knowing what is being whispered to whom, scholars have no good way to determine what effects, if any, this
new form of campaigning is having on the candidates, the voters and the process
writ large. If they are to subject micro-targeted campaign messages to their own
“culture[s] of testing,” as they should, scholars and reporters need to achieve
their own “analytics-based tactical optimization.” Doing so in both communities
should be a priority.

References
Andersen, K., and T. Clevenger, Jr. 1963. “A Summary of Experimental Research in Ethos.”
Speech Monographs 30: 59–78.
Ansolabehere, S., S. Iyengar, A. Simon, and N. Valentino. 1994. “Does Attack Advertising
Demobilize the Electorate?” American Political Science Review 88 (4): 829–838.
Ansolabehere, Stephen, and Shanto Iyengar. 1995. Going negative: How political
advertisements shrink and polarize the electorate. New York: The Free Press.
Arceneaux, K., and D. W. Nickerson. 2009. “Who is Mobilized to Vote? A Re-analysis of 11 Field
Experiments.” American Journal of Political Science 53 (1): 1–16.
Berlo, D., J. Lemert, and R. Mertz. 1969. “Dimensions for Evaluating the Acceptability of
Message Sources.” Public Opinion Quarterly 33: 563–576.
Elliot, J., ed. 2006. The debates in the several state conventions on the adoption of the federal
Constitution, as recommended by the general convention at Philadelphia, in 1787, orig.
pub. 1840, Scholarly Publishing Office, University of Michigan Library.
Fowler, E. F., and T. N. Ridout. 2013. “Negative, Angry, and Ubiquitous: Political Advertising in
2012.” The Forum 10: 51–61. doi:10.1515/forum-2013-0004.
Franz, M. M. 2013. “Interest Groups in Electoral Politics: 2012 in Context.” The Forum 10:
62–79. doi:10.1515/forum-2013-0007
Goldstein, K., and P. Freedman. 2002. “Campaign Advertising and Voter Turnout: New Evidence
for a Stimulation Effect.” Journal of Politics 64 (3): 721–740.
Green, D. P., and A. S. Gerber. 2008. Get Out the Vote: How to Increase Voter Turnout.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Jamieson, K. H. 1984. Packaging the Presidency: A History and Criticism of Presidential
Campaign Advertising (First Edition). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Brought to you by | University of Pennsylvania
Authenticated | 128.91.58.254
Download Date | 4/21/14 8:52 PM

Messages, Micro-targeting, and New Media Technologies

435

Jamieson, K. H. 1992. Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction and Democracy. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Jamieson, K. H. 2013. Electing the President, 2012. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania
Press.
Jamieson, K. H., and P. Waldman. 2003. The Press Effect: Politicians, Journalists, and the Stories
that Shape the Political World. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kenski, K., B. Hardy, and K. H. Jamieson. 2010. The Obama Victory: How Media, Money and
Message Shaped the 2008 election. New York: Oxford University Press.
Knight Foundation. 2013. 2012 Election Crushes Records for Campaign Advertising. http://
www.knightfoundation.org/blogs/knightblog/2013/2/14/2012-election-crushes-recordscampaign-advertising.
Lupia, A., and M. D. McCubbins. 1998. The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They
Need to Know? New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mayer, J. 2013. “A word from our sponsor.” The New Yorker. http://www.newyorker.com/
reporting/2013/05/27/130527fa_fact_mayer.
New York Times. 2012. “A shift in energy ads.” September 3, http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2012/09/14/us/politics/a-shift-in-energy-ads.html?_r=0.
New York Times. 2012. “2012 Elections: The Aftermath.” November 12, http://topics.nytimes.
com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/campaign_finance/index.html.
Popkin, S. 1994. The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential
Campaigns. 2nd ed. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Prior, M. 2007. Post-Broadcast Democracy: How Media Choice Increases Inequality in Political
Involvement and Polarizes Elections. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Rosenstone, S., and J. M. Hansen. 1993. Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Sniderman, P. M., R. A. Brody, and P. E. Tetlock. 1991. Reasoning in Choice: Explorations in
Political Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tsukayama, H. 2013. “Microtargeting has Growing Influence in Political Campaigns, Says
Interactive Advertising Bureau.” The Washington Post. http://www. washingtonpost.com/
blogs/post-tech/post/microtargeting-has-growing-influence-in-political-campaigns-saysinteractive-advertising-bureau/2013/02/26/32e0723e-8023-11e2-b99e-6baf4ebe42df_
blog.html.
Winneg, K., B. Hardy, J. Gottfried, and K. H. Jamieson. (in press). “Deception in Third Party
Advertising in the 2012 Presidential Campaign.” American Behavioral Scientist.

Kathleen Hall Jamieson is the Elizabeth Ware Packard Professor at the Annenberg School for
Communication of the University of Pennsylvania and Director of its Annenberg Public Policy
Center.

Brought to you by | University of Pennsylvania
Authenticated | 128.91.58.254
Download Date | 4/21/14 8:52 PM

